by John Gray
Putting assets on a blockchain can make them easier to transfer, but it doesn’t necessarily make markets more liquid or reduce the amount of capital needed to settle trades. Ethan Buchman, co-founder of Cosmos and CEO of Cycles, argues that the industry has been looking at the wrong side of the balance sheet.
More than half of the tokenised assets covered by one recent industry analysis showed no weekly transfer activity. It is a striking statistic for an industry that has spent years promising to revolutionise financial markets by putting assets on blockchains. If tokenisation is supposed to make finance more efficient, why are so many of these newly minted digital assets sitting idle?
For Ethan Buchman, the answer begins with a distinction that much of the industry has blurred: making an asset easier to transfer is not the same as making it liquid. “There are different things we’re talking about when we talk about tokenisation,” he says. One is the ability to move collateral more quickly, potentially reducing the amount that institutions need to hold against their positions. The other is the proliferation of tokens representing existing assets, each of which must find its own buyers and sellers.
The first can improve capital efficiency. The second may simply create more things to trade. “If the underlying security became a token, then yes, that would likely increase liquidity somewhat,” Buchman says. “But in this world where we’re creating these second-order tokenisation wrapper things, that’s just fragmenting liquidity.”
This question goes far beyond the theoretical as financial institutions increasingly explore tokenised securities, funds and other real-world assets. A blockchain can make an asset available around the clock, but it cannot guarantee that anyone will want to buy it. Nor does the ability to transfer a token instantly mean that a sufficiently deep market exists to absorb a large transaction without moving the price. “Liquidity isn’t free,” Buchman says. “It’s not just about how quickly you can move the thing. It’s about the depth of the order book and being able to liquidate.”
For all the excitement surrounding tokenisation, could the industry be confusing the digitisation of financial assets with a more fundamental transformation?
Finance is not just a market in assets
Buchman is one of the original co-founders of Cosmos, the blockchain ecosystem built around the idea that different networks should be able to communicate and transact with one another. His current focus, through Cycles, is on a different but related problem: how to make the financial system’s web of obligations more efficient. His argument is that the industry has become fixated on assets changing hands while paying insufficient attention to the liabilities that connect the balance sheets of banks, businesses, trading firms and investors.
“Everyone’s just thinking about the world as a spot market of assets,” he says. “But that’s not what actually exists in the world. The world’s not a spot market of assets; it’s a network of balance sheets.” An asset one party holds is often a liability another owes. And the economic purpose of liquidity is not simply to facilitate trading. It also ensures obligations can be met when they fall due.
“The only reason we care about whether I can liquidate $10m of Bitcoin without moving the price is that I might have dollar-denominated debt I need to settle,” Buchman explains. “If I can’t liquidate the Bitcoin, then I’m going to have a problem meeting my debt.”
In other words, market liquidity is often a means to an end: obtaining the money needed to discharge an obligation. But what if the system could reduce the amount of money required in the first place? This is the logic behind clearing and netting. Imagine three firms: A owes B £100, B owes C £100, and C owes A £100. If each obligation is settled separately, £300 must change hands. If the obligations are netted against one another, they cancel out. No money needs to move.
Real financial markets are considerably more complicated, of course, but the principle is already embedded in their infrastructure. Buchman points to foreign exchange settlement, where vast gross payment obligations can be offset against one another, leaving only a fraction of the total to be settled in cash. “More than 95% of the obligations actually net out,” he says, describing the scale of netting in major clearing systems. “So clearing is everywhere. But somehow the whole blockchain industry hasn’t really thought that we could do anything about managing liabilities and offering netting to liabilities generally.”
The irony, in his view, is that an industry promising to eliminate financial friction has concentrated on making transactions easier to execute rather than reducing the capital needed to settle them. “It’s not just about making things go faster; it’s about reducing how much is needed in the first place.”
The case for clearing without a central counterparty
In traditional markets, clearing is often associated with central counterparties (CCPs), institutions that stand between buyers and sellers, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. Through this process, they assume and manage counterparty credit risk, while also enabling netting between their members.
These institutions perform a valuable function, but their role comes with costs and risks of its own. Central counterparties concentrate significant amounts of risk, impose membership and collateral requirements, and can leave institutions managing liquidity across multiple clearing systems. Buchman is careful to distinguish the function of netting from the assumption of credit risk. The two are frequently bundled together, he argues, even though they solve different problems.
“The main thing a central counterparty is doing isn’t netting. The main thing it’s doing is underwriting everyone’s credit risk,” he says. Netting follows naturally once trades are channelled through a common counterparty, but it is not the same thing as guaranteeing that counterparties will meet their obligations.
This distinction is central to the approach being developed at Cycles. The project aims to calculate how obligations across a network can be netted without replacing the existing relationships between counterparties with a single intermediary.
“We don’t have to introduce new counterparties. We don’t have to mutate the credit structure. We can still calculate what could be netted down to reduce how much cash and crypto and assets and capital everyone actually needs to settle those debts.” The proposition is that more efficient netting need not require every participant to face a central institution. It could instead operate across a wider network of existing credit relationships.
That does not mean central counterparties are redundant. Buchman acknowledges that their ability to guarantee performance is valuable, particularly for institutions that want to trade with a broad range of market participants without independently assessing each one’s creditworthiness. Nor is netting without constraints: participants must be willing and legally able to offset their obligations, while credit risk still has to be assessed and managed. The challenge is to find ways to improve capital efficiency without creating new risks or simply shifting them elsewhere.
Buchman argues that the need for this additional layer could become more apparent as markets evolve. He points, for example, to the expansion of mandatory clearing for US Treasury repo transactions. If activity is distributed across multiple central counterparties, institutions may find that the capital they need to post and manage becomes fragmented across those systems. “You’re not going to have one super clearinghouse to rule them all,” he says. “A solution could allow you to clear across the network of firms and clearinghouses without becoming a super clearinghouse itself.”
The argument is not that existing infrastructure should be discarded, but that the benefits of clearing could be extended beyond the institutions and markets that already have access to it.
Beyond crypto: the overlooked market for trade credit
Buchman believes the potential application extends well beyond digital asset trading. One of the clearest examples is trade credit: the practice of businesses supplying goods or services and allowing customers to pay weeks or months later.
This is a basic feature of commercial life, but it also creates a vast web of receivables and payables. A supplier is owed money by a customer, while owing money to its own suppliers, employees, lenders or tax authorities. Those obligations can propagate through a supply chain, tying up working capital across multiple businesses. “This is the essence of finance and commerce,” Buchman says. “I ship you goods and you pay me in a month or two months or three months. That invoice is the essence. It’s not about the asset; it’s about the debt that is created.”
In his view, the opportunities for netting across these networks are substantial. A business might be owed money by one company while owing a similar amount to another. If those relationships can be mapped and the parties agree to the necessary arrangements, some obligations could be discharged without requiring every payment to be made gross.
The idea also raises the possibility of allowing businesses to participate more directly in extending credit. A company might be willing to accept the credit risk of another firm it knows and trusts, even if it has no direct trading relationship with it. In principle, a network that makes such relationships visible could help match those willing to extend credit with those who need it.
Buchman argues that this could broaden access to credit beyond the established intermediaries that currently dominate the market. But the practical questions are considerable: creditworthiness varies, businesses may not wish to assume unfamiliar risks, and a network’s ability to identify a possible match does not itself make that match commercially viable.
The underlying ambition is nevertheless broader than making payments faster. It is to identify economic relationships that cannot easily be realised through existing bilateral arrangements, and to find ways to make them work.
Buchman describes this as a multilateral version of the “coincidence of wants” problem that money was invented to solve. Money allows two people who want different things to transact indirectly. A network of obligations, he argues, could help connect a series of participants whose interests align across several transactions. “It can unlock entirely new outcomes and relationships and possibilities that weren’t possible before,” he says.
The next phase of financial innovation
The wider implications remain to be demonstrated. Netting across a large, diverse network requires reliable information about obligations, agreement on settlement rules, and careful handling of default and credit risk. Representing a transaction on a blockchain does not automatically make these problems disappear. But Buchman’s argument points towards a shift in the debate about tokenisation. The industry has often treated the movement of assets as the central bottleneck in finance, with faster settlement and round-the-clock trading presented as the obvious route to greater efficiency. Yet faster settlement can also mean that capital must be available more frequently, while a proliferation of tokenised assets can fragment liquidity rather than deepen it.
Cycles could also go further than existing infrastructure here. Clearing systems typically net trades only after they have been agreed, but Buchman argues that finding a trade and settling it can be done in a single step. If A wants an asset that B holds, B wants one that C holds, and C wants one that A holds, no pair has a deal on its own, but the loop as a whole does, and it can be settled all at once. For thinly traded assets, including many of the tokenised ones that now sit idle, this could produce trades that a conventional order book would never find.
The question, then, is not simply how quickly a financial asset can move from one owner to another. It is how much capital the system needs to support the network of obligations that surrounds it, and how much more of that network could be discharged if the trades participants are already willing to make were brought into the same calculation. Buchman believes that rethinking this problem could help firms do more with the same amount of capital, while reducing the pressure that liquidity shocks place on markets. The technology may help make this possible, but the essential insight is older than blockchain: financial obligations can often be settled more efficiently when they are considered together rather than one at a time.
“Everyone can do more with less,” he says. “Or at least do more with the same amount.” For an industry that has spent years putting assets on-chain, the next breakthrough may come from looking beyond the assets themselves. The real opportunity may lie in making the financial system’s underlying web of promises easier to see, connect and settle.